Scusa ma questo non é lo stesso che ho manadato io o mi sbaglio? (estaticos.el mundo.es)

Ho detto una cavolata?
Esperti, ma cosa ne pensate?

Crash: Spanair MD82 at Madrid on Aug 20th 2008, went off runway during takeof

The Spanish CIAIAC have released their final report in Spanish concluding the probable cause of the crash was:

The crew lost control of the aircraft as result of stall immediately after takeoff. The aircraft had not been properly configured for takeoff, following a series of errors and omissions the flaps and slats were not extended. The crew did not identify the stall nor did they take corrective action after takeoff. The crew did not action the relevant checklists thus failing to extend the flaps/slats as result of the "After Engine Start checklist", omitted the flaps/slats cross check in the "Takeoff Briefing Checklist", and failed to confirm the real position of the flaps and slats in the "Takeoff Imminent" checklist. After liftoff a number of warning indications including the stick shaker activated, the multitude of alerts together with the expectation/misperceiption of crew that the takeoff configuration had been applied contributed to the failure of the crew to detect the stall and correct the stall.

Contributing factors were:

- the absence of the takeoff configuration alert. It could not be conclusively determined why the takeoff configuration warning system failed.

- inadequate crew resource management which could not prevent deviation from standard operating procedures due to unscheduled interruptions during flight preparation.

The CIAIAC found that weather was not a factor. The crew did not follow the sterile cockpit concept and talked to a third person, thus got distracted from their duties. The crew did work the relevant checklists however executed them not completely, a few points were omitted of some checklists and some actions required by other checklists were not taken. That led to the omission of flap and slat extension as well as missing the cross checks. The checklist "After Engine Start" was interrupted causing the first opportunity to be missed to configure the aircraft properly. The item "Takeoff Briefing" in the "Taxi" checklist was omitted causing the second opportunity to catch the incorrect flap/slat settings to be missed. The third opportunity to catch the incorrect configuration was missed in the "Takeoff Imminent Checklist" that would have required the crew to compare the selector of slats/flaps with their actual positions.

The CIAIAC further found that the TakeOff Warning System was required to be operative for the flight, however its operation was required to be tested only before the first flight of the day.

33 safety recommendations were made as result of the investigation

The crew did not follow the sterile cockpit concept and talked to a third person, thus got distracted from their duties.