Su che basi tecniche si può escludere a priori, come hanno fatto le autorità coinvolte,che si tratti di un attentato? Spero non sia solo la mancanza di rivendicazione...

Sottolineo che la mia è una domanda vera, senza nessuna volontà di polemica.

Ricordo anche la particolare situazione libanese, dove certe notizie rischiano di essere molto pericolose sia in termini di sicurezza che in termini economico/sociali.

Saranno solo affermazioni ridicole tanto per scirvere qualcosa?

Carlo fai riferimento a questo filmato?

Carlo fai riferimento a questo filmato?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FZ73y0sxCfs

E cosa ci dovrebbe far capire questo filmato?

The Lebanese Civil Aviation Authority (LEBCAA) have released their preliminary report reporting, that the aircraft had received departure clearance from runway 21 via the LATEB 1D standard instrument departure route. Immediately prior to takeoff the clearance was changed to "immediate right turn direct Chekka". After takeoff tower instructed the aircraft to turn onto a heading of 315 degrees and change to control frequency. The crew acknowledged and continued the right hand turn. Although heading 315 was selected on the master control panel, the airplane continued until a heading of 003 degrees, a series of 10 bank angle warnings began while the airplane turned right. In the meantime Control had instructed the flight turn left to heading 270 degrees. The crew acknowledged the instruction, the aircraft initiated that left turn, 270 was selected on the master control panel, but the aircraft did not maintain the assigned heading. The aircraft turned onto a southerly heading, almost immediately followed by a first stick shaker activation that lasted for 29 seconds, about 13 seconds after the stick shaker activation the airplane reached its maximum angle of attack of +32 degrees. Another stick shaker activation followed 55 seconds after the first activation, this time the stick shaker operated for 26 seconds. During these 26 seconds the aircraft made two sharp left turns reaching a maximum left bank angle of 118 degrees and a nose down attitude of 63.1 degrees during the second left turn. 3 seconds after the stick shaker ceased the overspeed clacker activated and continued until impact at approx. N33.743 E35.410 about 15 seconds later. In those last seconds the aircraft reached a speed of 407.5 KIAS and a G-load of 4.412. The aircraft left a debris field 300 meters long and 100 meters wide, all on board perished. The waters are about 45 meters deep in that area.

The captain (44, ATPL, 10,233 hours total, 188 hours on type in command) had accumulated 2,437 hours in command on various light and spray aircraft, 1,052 hours in command on Fokker 50s and 188 hours in command on Boeing 737-700/800s after becoming accordingly rated on Dec 3rd 2009. On the day prior to the crash he had flown flight ET-408 to Beirut reaching Beirut about 25 hours before the accident departure.

The first officer (33, CPL issued Apr 7th 2009, 673 hours total, 350 hours on type) had also flown ET-408 on the day prior to the crash.

The aircraft had accumulated 26,459 hours in 17,823 cycles since its first flight in 2002. The aircraft joined Ethiopian Airlines on Sep 12th 2009.

The LEBCAA did not find any anomalies in the aircraft documentation including maintenance logs.

The flight data recorder was recovered on Feb 7th 2010, all data could be extracted by the French BEA.

The cockpit voice recorder was recovered from the sea on Feb 10th 2010 however the memory part was missing. The memory was recovered on Feb 16th 2010, however one of the 16 memory chips was found cracked resulting in about 10 seconds of recordings missing every 4 minutes. The chip is likely to be unreadable, however additional attempts to restore the chip's contents are underway.

About 8 percent of the aircraft were recovered from the sea. As a result of many examinations the airworthiness group recommended further analysis of a number of parts including the stabilizer trim tab control mechanism bearings and sooth near the APU exhaust.

As result of those investigations and another occurrence (see: Incident: Ryanair B738 near Brussels on Mar 1st 2010, severe vibrations as result of elevator tab control failure) the FAA released emergency airworthiness directive 2010-06-51 in March 2010 and airworthiness directive 2010-17-19 in August 2010, also see: News: FAA and EASA release EAD for B736-B739 to examine elevator control tab mechanisms.

The investigation committee hopes to draft the final report until May 15th 2011. After a period of 60 days to comment on the final draft the final report is expected to be released by the end of July 2011.