Avrei voluto esserci per sentire lo sciopone

P.S. An-124!

Nessun pennuto si può ritenere responsabile di ciò che è accaduto al Ruslan.

La storia dei pennuti era riportata da The Aviation Herald qui

Secondo me è stato un problema tecnico,infatti i piloti prima di dare gas,sono stati un bel pò fermi in testata pista,poi alla partenza non hanno dato la massima potenza,quasi si aspettassero,qualche sorta di problema.

Questa credo sia una procedura normale, ho assistito alla stessa cosa qui a Malpensa lo scorso anno... Pensavo anche io che ci fosse qualcosa che non andava, invece credo sia un test sui motori, per portarli a regime o verificare che sia tutto a posto...
Lì da voi il test a quanto pare non è servito allo scopo...

Tornando in argomento, sarei curioso di sapere se il motore è stato sostituto o sono state effettuate delle ripazioni (on "pylon" ).

...

Steve

Mi lascia molto perplesso ! Sicuramente il problema esiste , ma sono ancora più curioso di capire come potrà essere applicata una raccomandazione ANSV ad un produttore della federazione Russa !

Steve

Non ci sono accordi/convenzioni per l'attuazione di tali direttive? In ogni caso se un Ruslan dovesse tornare in Italia la raccomandazione dovrà essere recepita e l'equipaggio o chi per lui ne dovrà dare evidenza?

Incident: Volga-Dnepr A124 at Torino on Sep 9th 2010, rejected takeoff, two engines flamed out


Fragment of upper half-ring 5th stage with vane #1

The ANSV published a safety recommendation to Russia's Interstate Aviation Committee (MAK) stating:

The serious incident occurred on Turin-Caselle airport demonstrates that engine failsafe operation on model D18T series is not guaranteed at all on the ones not yet modified.

ANSV - considering the very high MTOW of the aircraft on which D18T engine series are installed, considering the safety level of an uncommanded engine shut down during take-off on those aircraft, considering the Temporary Change 559 that is not supported by analysis related to the "fatigue progression" on HPC 5th stage (the document was issued by the Operator) - recommends Interstate Aviation Committee that the modification stated on the engine Designer documents (D18T-1567 and 18T25446) must be completely carried out on each engine installed onboard an aircraft before it could be airworthy. The solution adopted by engine Designer (modification to the successive scheduled shop visit) appears to be not acceptable and not sufficient at all (ANSV-13/1687-10/1/1/11).

The ANSV reported that the aircraft was accelerating through 50 KIAS, when engine #4 (outboard right) failed followed by uncommanded shut down of the engine. The crew rejected takeoff. During application of reverse thrust engine #1 (outboard left) surged followed by an uncommanded shut down. The aircraft slowed safely and stopped on the runway, flames and smoke were witnessed from engines #1 and #4.

The investigation so far showed, that the #1 engine surged and shut down because reverse thrust was applied at a speed lower than prescribed in the operating manual.

The #4 engine suffered mechanical damage in stage 6 of the high pressure compressor "where it was completely missing one blade and where the fracture at the place of tenon disengagement from groove No 94 showed presence of fatigue."

Analysis of the engine showed multiple cracking zones in the area of the stage 5 guide vanes. The ANSV said: "The cracks on the HPC 5th stage guide vanes induce a rotation on the longitudinal axis of the vanes with following variation of the angle of attack of the air flow on the 6th rotor stage. This kind of variation induces fatigue phenomena, found on the HPC 6th stage."

The engine manufacturer had already reported to be aware of the issues in the stage 5 and had released modification documents in October 2007, the modifications thought to be applied during the next engine shop visit. The manufacturer guaranteed the fail safe operation of the engines until the end of the modification.

The ANSV however argued that the incident in Torino shows the fail safe operation of the engines can not be guaranteed until the modifications have been applied.